



























































In this paper, we employ a registry of legal insider trading for Dutch listed
ﬁrms to investigate the information content of trades by corporate insiders.
Using a standard event-study methodology, we examine short-term stock price
behavior around trades. We ﬁnd that purchases are followed by economically
large abnormal returns. This result is strongest for purchases by top execu-
tives and for small market capitalization ﬁrms, which is consistent with the
hypothesis that legal insider trading is an important channel through which
information ﬂows to the market. We analyze also the impact of the implemen-
tation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC),
which strengthens the existing regulation in the Netherlands. We show that
the new regulation reduced the information content of sales by top executives.
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11 Introduction
Since the 1990s, countries worldwide have put into practice regulations against trading
based on private information, from what it seems a consensus within the regulatory
bodies that insider trading should be banned (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). In
the Netherlands, the current principles of law concerning securities trading, in line
with the directives of the European Union on market manipulation and market abuse,
stipulate that anyone in possession of private and price-sensitive information is not
allowed to trade. Within this framework, legal insider trading, i.e. trading in one’s
own company’s stock, is allowed provided that the trader is not in possession of such
information. In addition, corporate insiders have to report their trades to a national
registry of insider trading.
Even though their information might not qualify as “private” and “price-sensitive”
when they trade, insiders may have more in-depth knowledge about the prospects of
their company compared to other market participants. This information can manifest
itself through abnormal stock price movement around their trades. In this paper, we
investigate how important these price movements are, as well as the eﬀect of regulation
changes on these abnormal returns.
We measure empirically the short-term eﬀects on the stock price when insiders
trade, using the national registry of insider trading from the AFM (the Authority
for the Financial Markets, the Dutch regulatory body in charge of the supervision of
ﬁnancial markets). We aim to answer the question whether insiders are trading upon
special information, or mostly for liquidity reasons. The stock price eﬀect of insider
trading (whether it is a signal of new information or merely a market reaction) is
measured by abnormal returns, estimated by the standard event study methodology.
Our dataset spans a long time period, from 1999 to 2008. The Netherlands is
one of the countries in continental Europe with the longest history of insider trading
2regulation and reporting of trades in a public registry. Our study diﬀers from other
insider trading studies since we focus on individual trades, as opposed to aggregated
purchases or sales. Also, in a cross-sectional regression framework, we study the
information content of trades by controlling for both trade characteristics and ﬁrm-
level characteristics. This allows us to determine which trades are mostly information
driven, and which are not. In doing so, we distinguish between trades that follow the
exercise of employee stock options from trades in shares only.
Another important contribution of this paper is testing the eﬀect of changes in
insider trading regulations that occurred since the start of the insider trading registry
in 1999. The ﬁrst registration regime in eﬀect until 2002 concerned all insiders. They
had to notify their trades into a single public registry without distinction of position in
the ﬁrm. Starting from September 2002, top executives had to register separately, so
that we can identify the eﬀect of their trades relative to the trades of other insiders.
In 2005, the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) was
incorporated into Dutch law. As a consequence, the penalty for illegal insider trading
was increased for top executives, and the notiﬁcation delay was reduced for other
insiders. These three regulation regimes are studied in a regression framework that
allows controlling for confounding factors.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Legal trades by corporate insiders
indeed reveal information to the market. Moreover, trades by insiders that are higher
in the hierarchy of the ﬁrm have larger eﬀects than trades by other insiders, especially
for share purchases. In average, these purchases by top executives are followed by
a risk-adjusted abnormal return of 2% in the month following the purchase date
(i.e. 24% on an annual basis), which is economically very large. It is in a same
order of magnitude as other similar studies in European countries such as Germany
and Italy, but higher than studies in U.K. and U.S. Trades in shares have more
information content than trades following the exercise of employee stock options. In
3addition, insiders have a good timing ability: they buy after a price decrease and sell
after a price increase.
Overall our results show that in average, insiders are more informed than other
market participants, even though this informational advantage is not reﬂected in each
single trade. As such, trading by insiders can be analyzed to learn about the fun-
damental value of stocks. This is consistent with insider trading being an important
channel of information ﬂow from the company to the market.
In testing the impact of a change in regulation, we ﬁnd that the Market Abuse
Directive implemented in 2005 had no eﬀect on the information content of share
purchases. Holding other factors constant, top executives’ purchases are still followed
by positive abnormal returns. The only signiﬁcant eﬀect of this regulation change is
a reduction in the information content of top executives’ sales. These trades are now
followed by less negative abnormal returns.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related
literature. Readers who want to go to our results directly can skip this section. In
Section 3, we explain the essentials of insider trading regulation in the Netherlands.
Section 4 presents a description of the data used and the methodology. Section 5
presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Although many asset pricing and market microstructure models are based on infor-
mation asymmetry, very few theoretical papers have looked on the speciﬁc aspect of
informed traders having to disclose their trades. To our knowledge, only two papers
address directly the question from a theoretical perspective: Huddart, Hughes, and
Levine (2001) and Buﬀa (2008). Both papers build a theoretical model inspired by
4Kyle (1985) in which informed traders have to disclose their trades, thus the market
maker can ex post distinguish between the order ﬂow of informed traders and noise
traders. When this trading game is repeated, the authors show that the well known
Kyle (1985) equilibrium cannot exist. In order to ﬁnd an equilibrium, the authors
allow the informed traders to submit trading demand with a random component. In
this case, the market maker cannot exactly infer the information content of the trade.
This last feature of the model is consistent with what is found in empirical stud-
ies about legal insider trading. Since insiders have to disclose their trades ex post,
they will trade in a fashion such that it is very diﬃcult to infer the extent of their
information. By doing so, they will submit some trades that are uninformed, as if
they were based on liquidity needs or diversiﬁcation. They will post as well some
informed trades, so that in average the information content of the trades is small.
On the contrary to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature on legal
insider trading is sizable. An important, recent paper about insider trading in the
U.S. market is Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003). The authors use SEC ﬁllings
on insider trading from 1975 to 1996. They study short term as well as long term
abnormal returns to insider trading. Their methodology uses performance evaluation
methods from the mutual fund literature. They form portfolios by buying stocks for
which insiders provide a “buy” signal and hold them for a given number of days. For
companies for which insiders provide a “sell” signal, they form a “sale” portfolio by
buying stocks of these companies and holding to them for a given period of time.
For comparative purposes with our results, we report their results using short
holding periods. They obtain a signiﬁcant 2.5 to 2.8 % for the 6-day holding period
for the buy portfolio, and a positive 0.8 to 0.9% for the sell portfolio. The positive
abnormal return for a sell portfolio is not well understood, because we expect either
negative returns if the insiders are informed, or zero returns if the trades have a liq-
uidity or diversiﬁcation motive. But this result is similar to the ﬁndings of Eckbo
5and Smith (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Aktas, De Bodt, and Van Op-
pens (2007). Breaking down into trade size (volume terciles), they ﬁnd that for the
purchase portfolio, larger trades result in larger abnormal returns.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use the same data as in the previous paper, but their
methodology is closer to the event study methodology. They compute abnormal
returns as excess returns over the market return. With an event window of ﬁve
days, they obtain positive abnormal returns both for purchases (0.59%) and for sales
(0.17%). Breaking down the results by ﬁrm size, they obtain an asymmetry between
the eﬀect of purchases and sales. For purchases, small ﬁrms have higher abnormal
returns (it is even slightly negative for large ﬁrms). For sales, it is the contrary, the
abnormal returns are more negative for large ﬁrms. Aktas, De Bodt, and Van Oppens
(2007) reproduce the results of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) with similar U.S. data.
They also ﬁnd a positive abnormal return in the short run following sales by insiders.
The authors argue that insiders are inclined to sell their shares when the market is
dominated by a buy pressure (e.g. following good news announcements) in order to
make sure that liquidity is suﬃcient.
A recent study of insider trading in the U.K. was done by Fidrmuc, Goergen,
and Renneboog (2006), with data from the end of the 1990s. The results of their
event study is that purchases and sales are followed by signiﬁcant abnormal returns
of the expected sign, both for 2-day and 5-day event windows. When diﬀerentiating
between trades sizes, they ﬁnd that large trades confer larger abnormal returns for
purchases. For sales, the diﬀerence in CAR is small.
The Norwegian market has been studied by Eckbo and Smith (1998). The ap-
proach in this paper is similar to Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) in the sense
that the authors use insider trading as a information on which they build a trading
strategy, with monthly data. In contrast to other European studies, including ours,
their event study analysis shows no signiﬁcant abnormal returns for purchase months.
6Also, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant price increase in a month of sales, followed by a month of
negative abnormal returns. The diﬀerences in results is most probably due to their
methodology, which is designed for long-term evaluation of portfolio performances.
Recently, legal insider trading has been studied for the German market. Betzer
and Theissen (2008) use a dataset that spans from July 2002 to June 2004. Similar to
the Dutch case, reporting delay of insiders varies a lot. Although the law stipulates
that insiders have to report their trades without delay, more than half of their sample
report after two days, and 7.6% of the trades are reported more than 30 days late.
Note also that on the contrary to the Dutch regulations, in Germany insiders do not
have to respect a blackout period, i.e. a period before major news, like earnings an-
nouncements, where insider trading is banned. The authors ﬁnd very large abnormal
returns after insider trading, and suggest that they are due to trades made before
such earnings announcements. The CARs have a magnitude of more than 2% in ab-
solute value for both purchases and sales in a 11-day window including the trade day,
and of 3.4% to 4.4% using large trades only.1 On a larger event window of 21 days,
they obtain 6% abnormal returns for purchases and almost -5% abnormal returns for
sales.
For the Italian market, a paper by Bajo and Petracci (2006) shows that legal
insider trades are followed by high abnormal returns, in the order of 3.18% 10 days
following purchases and -3.67% for sales. They use about 4 years of data between 1998
and 2002. In a 5-week post-trade event window, the cumulative abnormal returns for
purchases reach 7.29%, but is mainly driven by trades made by insiders owning more
than 50% of all the shares outstanding of their company. Their results show as well
that there is an asymmetry of response in terms of CAR for purchases and sales, with
respect to the insider’s holdings prior to the trade. Insiders owning between 30%
1Their deﬁnition of large trades is trade value that is more than 0.1% of the value of all shares
outstanding.
7and 50% of the shares have negative or no abnormal returns after their pruchases,
but very high negative abnormal returns after their sales. By contrast, insiders that
own more than 50% of the shares of the company have high and positive anormal
returns after their purchases, but relatively low negative abnormal returns following
their sales.
Another study is made for the Spanish market. The paper is by Del Brio, Miguel,
and Perote (2002) and uses 5 years of data from 1992 to 1996. The speciﬁcity of
the Spanish notiﬁcation duty is that insiders have to tell the reason for trading their
company’s shares, which is not the case in the Dutch legislation. That makes it
possible for the authors to remove transactions by insiders that are arguably not
made upon information, like inheritance, bonus and gifts. In addition, the authors
use non contaminated estimation windows. Their results are that there is a small
but statistically signiﬁcant abnormal return on the trading day itself, even though
the trade was not yet announced to the public. For purchases, the 2-day CAR is not
signiﬁcant, but the 2-day CAR for sales is positive and signiﬁcant (0.37%), which is
another example of this unexplained positive reaction to insider sales.
There are two papers which study legal insider trading on the Dutch stock market.
The ﬁrst is by Biesta, Doeswijk, and Donker (2003). Although the aim of their paper
is to assess the proﬁtability of insider’s portfolio based on a holding period of six
months, they provide as well results on short term stock price movement after insider
trading. Their data is from 1999 to 2003, and unlike us, they do not diﬀerentiate
between top executives and other insiders. They use event study analysis and keep
only non-overlapping event windows, further reducing their sample size. On a 21-day
event window (i.e. from day zero to day 20), they obtain a signiﬁcant 2.2% average
cumulative abnormal return for purchases. On a smaller event window, their CARs
are positive but not signiﬁcant. On the contrary, for sales, they obtain signiﬁcant
negative CARs for shorter event windows (-2.8% from day zero to day 10) but not for
8longer windows.
The second study with Dutch data, Aktas, De Bodt, Riachi, and de Smedt (2007),
uses a similar dataset as ours, although less complete.2 The authors use a market-
adjusted model to compute CARs around insider trades, not diﬀerentiating between
top executives and other insiders. They ﬁnd very small abnormal returns of less than
0.4% for purchases and almost -0.2% for sales, in a three day event window, including
the transaction day. When they separate on trade value quartiles, they obtain a
signiﬁcant 2.3% for purchases on the very small trades in 2-day post-trade window,
not including the trade day itself. When they include the trade day, the results
become small and insigniﬁcant. With such a small event window, a large proportion
of the trades are not yet made public. So it is not clear what causes the abnormal
returns. It is well possible that a news announcement causes a drift in the stock price,
during which the insiders trade. Indeed, Dutch companies have a blackout period3
before important announcements, and insiders are allowed to trade only after the
announcement. In that case, the abnormal returns are due to the post-announcement
drift, and not to insider trades. By using a larger event window, we make sure that
such situations do not bias our results.
Finally, there is a paper that sheds light on insider trading around news announce-
ments. Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) study the diﬀerence between insider trading
before and after a regulation in the U.S. that obliged companies to follow a black-
out period before important news announcements. This is an important question
since some companies have strict corporate governance rules that allow their insiders
to trade only in some open windows after quarterly earnings announcements. This
means that insiders can only trade after a public announcement. The question in
2The public registry of insider trading in the Netherlands available on the AFM website does
not contain trades by former insiders and ﬁrms that are not public anymore (because of merger,
bankruptcy, etc.) Thanks to our collaboration with the AFM, we use the full insider trading
database.
3See next section for details about blackout periods and insider trading regulations.
9the paper by Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) is whether insiders always trade in the
direction of the news announcement (i.e. buying shares when news is good, selling
shares when the news is bad) even when the price has already started to move. They
ﬁnd that it is not the case. Insiders might well sell after a good news announcement,
or vice versa. On average, they make proﬁts from their trades, even when they trade
against the public news announcement. The authors argue that insiders know when
the market is overly optimistic about some good news, or overly pessimistic about
bad news. In these cases, trading as contrarians is proﬁtable.
This paper by Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) shows that insiders have the ability
to determine when the market is mis-pricing their company’s stock. The paper sug-
gests also that using a too short event window after trades by insiders might capture
the price drift after some news announcement, since insider trades occur often after
press releases, instead of the true impact of the trade. It also implies that with a
suﬃciently large event window, one might capture better the information content of
the trade.
To summarize, the literature ﬁnds in general that insider purchases are mostly
informed, whereas insider sales are mostly liquidity or diversiﬁcation motivated, and
thus not (or less) informed. Some studies use a methodology diﬀerent from ours in
that they use insider trading as a portfolio formation strategy, for which they evaluate
the performance. Other studies use an event study methodology similar to the present
paper. In general, studies from the U.S. and the U.K. have weaker results in the sense
that the abnormal returns are smaller in absolute value, and less signiﬁcant. Studies
about European countries have larger abnormal returns, in the order of magnitude of
a monthly 2%, for insider purchases (Netherlands and Spain), which is in line with
our results. For Germany and Italy, the abnormal returns are much higher: about
7%. It is argued that in Germany insiders are not prevented to trade in advance
of important information events, and in Italy, the results are driven by very large
10shareholders that control 50% or more of the shares. No paper analyzes the exercise
of employee stock option separately from trades in shares, like we do, and neither use
de-aggregated data in order to study the eﬀect of a single trade. They all aggregate
the insider trades in a given company.
The next section develops on the Dutch regulation concerning insider trading.
3 Regulation
Since March 2002, the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) supervises Dutch
ﬁnancial markets. The AFM is responsible for the market supervision and the appli-
cation of the diﬀerent laws regulating conduct of ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial
markets. One of its duties is to supervise insider trading and to maintain a public
registry of all transactions made by corporate insiders of listed companies. Insider
trading is regulated in the Netherlands since 1987 (see Kabir and Vermaelen, 1996).
Dutch laws on insider trading mainly implement E.U. directives, in particular the
Insider Dealing Directive 89/592/EEC and its successor, the Market Abuse Directive
2003/6/EC. The principles of law concerning insider trading are similar to those found
in the U.S. or in the U.K.: it is forbidden for all market participants to trade according
to private and price-sensitive information. Private information means information
that is not publicly available to the market. Price-sensitive information means an
information that is likely to aﬀect the price of the company’s stock. Examples of
such information are ﬁnancial results or merger negotiation.
In addition to the prohibition of trade based on private information, there is the
obligation for insiders to report their trades on their company’s stock. Here, insid-
ers are deﬁned as directors, managers, members of the supervisory board, employees
and member of staﬀ that are in contact with potentially private, price-sensitive in-
11formation, as well as their spouse/partner and children living with them. The law
stipulates that every listed company should have a written set of rules of conduct that
speciﬁes among other things when an insider is not allowed to trade (the so-called
blackout periods). The notiﬁcation duty concerns trades in shares or in any other
standardized instruments for which the value depends on the value of the share. This
includes employee stock options.
The companies that are tied by these rules include all publicly listed companies
registered in the Netherlands (even if they are not listed in Euronext Amsterdam).
Included are as well all companies (be it European of foreign) that have ﬁnancial
instruments listed on Euronext Amsterdam.
3.1 Act of the Supervision of Securities Trade 1995
From April 1999 until September 2006, there were two main acts that regulated insider
trading. The ﬁrst is called the Act of the Supervision of the Securities Trade 1995 (or
Wte 1995). In 1999, some provisions concerning the notiﬁcation of insiders’ trades
and the disclosure of these trades in the public registry were added.4 At that time,
the rules speciﬁed that the reporting by insiders should be no later than ten days
after the end of the month in which the trade occurred.5
3.2 Act of the Disclosure of Major Holdings 1996
The second set of rules concerning insider trading are those arising from the Act of the
Disclosure of Major Holdings and Capital Interests in Securities-Issuing Institutions
1996 (or Wmz 1996). This act obliged all major shareholders to disclose the level
of their holding. In October 2002, a new provision in this act came into eﬀect and
4Cf. Rules on the Notiﬁcation and Regulation of Securities Transactions 1999.
5Id., Section 4.
12concerned the disclosure of the holding and voting rights by directors and members
of the supervisory board (what we call Top executives for simplicity. We call the
insiders not in this category Other insiders.) Top executives had still to notify the
AFM of their trades but the information was disclosed to the public by the AFM
through a diﬀerent registry. They had to report their trades as soon as possible,
without delay. This Act expired in October 2006 and was replaced by another one
with similar provisions.
3.3 The Market Abuse Decree 2005
In October 2005, the European Market Abuse Directive6 was incorporated into Dutch
law as the Market Abuse Decree that modiﬁes the Wte 1995. This directive is con-
cerned by market abuse in general and has the aim of increasing market integrity and
conﬁdence. The provisions relating to insider trading have the eﬀect of increasing
substantially the penalties to illegal insider trading. In addition, the legal reporting
delay for other insiders is brought to ﬁve working days after the date of the transac-
tion. However, notiﬁcations can be delayed until the moment that the value of the
transactions reach or exceed the amount of A C5,000 in the calendar year in question.
The implication is that if this A C5,000 threshold is not reached in a particular calendar
year, no notiﬁcation need be sent. Also, insiders do not have to report acquisitions of
shares or other instruments as part of a regular employee compensation scheme. The
exception extends to the sale of shares acquired by exercising employee stock options
as part of a scheme, if the exercise was made at the day of expiry or ﬁve working
days prior to expiry and if there was a written note made by the insider at least four
months in advance that revealed its intention to sell the shares so obtained.
Table 1 summarizes the main provisions of the law and tracks the changes made
6Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).
13in time.
[Table 1 about here.]
The next section explains more precisely the data and methodology used. The
results follow.
4 Data and methodology
We have access to two diﬀerent insider trading databases. The ﬁrst one includes
trades from top executives, such as directors and members of the supervisory board,
as prescribed by Article 2a of Wmz 1996. We call this database “Top executives”.
Entries in this dataset go from September 2002 until December 2007, inclusive. The
second dataset includes trades from what we call “Other insiders”, i.e. corporate
insiders that are not part of the management board or the supervisory board. This
registry is based on Sections 46b and 47a of Wte 1995, and includes trades from April
1999 until June 2008, inclusive. Note that before September 2002, top executives’
trades are included in the “Other insiders” database without distinction.
From both databases, we use trades of shares and employee stock options, and
ﬁrms that are listed in the Netherlands that have price history available from Datas-
tream. We discard investment funds, leaving us with a total of 149 listed ﬁrms.
The data can be analyzed according to two diﬀerent levels of aggregation. The
concept of “company-day” is a day when a company has insider trading. If at a given
date, two or more insiders from the same company report trades, we group them into
one trade. The direction of this trade (i.e. whether it is a buy or a sell) is determined
by aggregating the trades. If more shares are sold than bought, the event is classiﬁed
as a sell, and vice versa. In addition, we use “insider-day” events, i.e. days when a
14given insider trades. In the above example, there would be two observations. This is
the least aggregated level insider trading.
For the univariate analysis, we use company-days events. But later, in the mul-
tivariate analysis, we use insider-days events to capture the eﬀect of insider-speciﬁc
characteristics on the information content of trades.
Table 2 shows the number of observations according to the two levels of aggre-
gation. We have overall 1,654 diﬀerent insiders that reported trades. The number of
insider-days events is 5,761. Aggregating to company-days events gives us a total of
3,612 observations. Notice that the number of insider-days is larger than the number
of company-days. This shows that insiders from a given company trade often on the
same day (but not necessarily on the same side).7
[Table 2 about here.]
The main hypotheses of this paper are tested using the event study methodology.
We follow the method outlined in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). In this part
of the methodology, we use company-day events because the ex-post performance of
a given stock is the same whether there is one or many insiders who trade during that
day. The time line of the event study is described in Figure 1. The event, i.e. a trade
by an insider, occurs at period Te. In order to calculate the abnormal returns, we need
to estimate the parameters of the predictive model. These parameters are estimated
in the estimation window, which occurs before the event, from time period T0 until
but excluding period T1 (n observations). Once the parameters are estimated, the
abnormal returns are calculated during the so-called event window, from period T1
to period T2. There are m periods in the event window, including periods that are
7Most, if not all of the empirical literature about insider trading use aggregated measures of
insider trading. Some authors use company-days events, some discard company-days where insiders
traded in diﬀerent directions, because it is interpreted as a conﬂicting signal. Some papers use
company-months events. The beneﬁt of using de-aggregated data is to analyze the eﬀect of insider
or trade-speciﬁc characteristics, which is not possible when many trades and insiders are aggregated.
15prior to the actual event. In this paper, we use n = 250 trading days as estimation
period, and m = 51 trading days as event period (the event day itself, plus 20 and
30 trading days before and after then event, respectively).
[Figure 1 about here.]
As predictive model for the normal rate of return we use the market model (with
the AEX index return as a proxy for the market return). The parameters are esti-
mated by OLS with one year of data prior to the event window. To test the signiﬁcance
of the cumulative abnormal returns, we use the J2 test statistic of Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1997). For more detail on the event study methodology and the test
statistic, see Appendix A.
We measure the cumulative abnormal returns for an event window of 20 trading
days (i.e. approximately one calendar month) prior to the trade up to 30 trading days
after the event, thus for an event window of 51 days. The event date is the day of the
transaction – not the day at which the trade was made public. The signiﬁcance levels
are from a two-sided test. We use company-day observations (i.e. when many insiders
from the same company trade during the same day, their trades are aggregated).
The second part of the empirical analysis is a cross-sectional regression of the cu-
mulative abnormal returns following insiders’ trades. We use insider-day observations
and regress the individual CARs on a set of explanatory variables:
CAR = XΓ + ￿ ,
where X is the matrix of regressors and Γ is the vector of the associated coeﬃcients.
￿ is the vector of error terms.
We use robust standard errors that are corrected both for clustering (same com-
pany, same date) and for heteroskedasticity between ﬁrms. See Appendix C for the
16details of the methodology regarding the robust standard-deviations.
5 Results
In this section, we present the event study results. Subsection 5.1 shows how the
average cumulative abnormal return varies with ﬁrm characteristics and insider type.
The CAR shown is for trades aggregated by company-date (buy or sell signal by a
ﬁrm for a given day). Subsection 5.2 studies in a regression framework the eﬀect
of trade-speciﬁc and insider-speciﬁc variables, such as trade size, prior holdings and
notiﬁcation delay. For that analysis, we do not aggregate insider trades for a given
company on a given date, but rather we use insider-date observations. The results
will also give a diﬀerent view on ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables because we control for char-
acteristics such as industry and reporting delay. The analysis will also help to study
the eﬀect of regulatory regimes on the information content of insider trading.
All the variables used in the empirical analysis are deﬁned in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
We start the description of our empirical results by discussing the market reactions
around trades by all insiders. Figure 2 shows the average cumulative abnormal return
(or CAR) around purchases and sales by all insiders. The horizontal axis represents
the number of days before and after the trade. Day zero is the event day, i.e. the
transaction day. The curves are normalized to have an average CAR of zero at day
−1, so that the curve at time t = 0 shows the the event day eﬀect. The graph shows
price movements before and after the trade as well. The markers show the two-sided
signiﬁcance of the average CAR (that is, a test that the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero).
17[Figure 2 about here.]
If we believe that insiders provide new information to the market when trading,
and that they have timing ability, the average CAR curve for purchases should have
a “V” shape with the spike at day zero. This would mean that insiders wait for
the right moment to buy shares (i.e. they wait for the price to be low), and this
purchase provides a positive signal to the market, which would make the price rise.
This is precisely what we observe for the trades in shares. In a window of one month
prior to purchases, we see that prices are decreasing by 1% on average (statistically
signiﬁcant). During the month and a half after purchases, the cumulative abnormal
returns are increasing very steadily by more than 2%. This is a sign of persistence of
the daily abnormal returns, which is conﬁrmed by the fact that the abnormal returns
are typically more and more signiﬁcant the further we move from the trading date.
They start to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level from day 8 after
the trade.
Concerning sales (dotted line of Figure 2), we see the opposite pattern, an inverted
“V” shape: the price increase before the trade is quite strong and steady (about -
1.3%), and after the trade, we observe a decrease in prices of more than 2%, signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. This means that even if sales are partly based on diversiﬁcation and
liquidity purposes, thus are less likely to confer new information, in average they still
are informative. Also, the sales take place at the right moment (after a price increase
of about 1.3% on average). This shows the timing ability of insiders with respect to
sales of shares.
Figure 3 shows the CAR around the exercise of employee stock options, for all
insiders. We separated these option exercises in two categories: instances where
insiders exercise their options and sell all their shares (exercise and sell), and instances
where insiders keep at least some of the shares obtained with the option (exercise and
18keep). This latter category occurs rarely – only 108 times in the whole sample. The
rationale for separating these categories is that keeping (part of the) shares could
mean that insiders have positive information, whereas selling all shares could mean
negative information about the ﬁrm.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The results show that for both categories (exercise and keep, exercise and sell), the
abnormal returns are not signiﬁcant after the trade. This means that no information
is provided by these trades in average. But insiders still have a good timing ability:
they choose to exercise their options after a price increase. This timing is at its best
when insiders exercise and sell their shares: the price increase in the month prior to
the trade is close to 3%.
5.1 Insider types
Breaking down these results into diﬀerent categories of insiders can help to under-
stand which trades are more important. Figure 4 shows the same graph, but for
top executives and other insiders separately, and for trades of shares and exercise of
options. The top left graph shows that trades in shares by top executives are infor-
mative only for purchases, for which abnormal returns cumulate to about 3.4%, 30
trading days after the trade. Following sales, we observe negative abnormal returns
of about 2.8%, although less signiﬁcant than for purchases. Moreover, their timing
ability seems to be weak: the abnormal returns prior to the trade are close to zero.
This means either that top executives do not have timing ability, or that they do not
have the freedom to trade whenever they want. The results here cannot distinguish
between these two explanations.
[Figure 4 about here.]
19The top right graph of Figure 4 shows the average CAR for other insiders when
they trade in shares. We see that the information content of the trades is weak: the
curves do not show much statistical signiﬁcance in the post-trade window. But the
averages are of the “right” sign. In contrast, the CARs prior to the trades are very
pronounced. Purchases are preceded by a signiﬁcant -2% abnormal return and sales,
by a 1.9% abnormal return, statistically signiﬁcant as well. This implies that other
insiders have the ability and freedom to choose the right moment for executing their
trades, but they cannot predict the price movement of the stocks.
Now for trades related to the exercise of employee stock options, we see by the
sample sizes that most of the time, insiders liquidate their shares when exercising
options. This is consistent with diversiﬁcation, as they typically have already a large
stake in their company through their employment. The small sample sizes of exercise
and keep may explain also the low signiﬁcance level of the CARs, both for top exec-
utives and other insiders. But we can distinguish a certain pattern when exercising
the option and liquidating the shares. Both top executives and other insiders seem
to have good timing ability as the left part of the curves is signiﬁcantly negative.
5.2 Firm characteristics
Following the literature (see Section 2), we condition the abnormal returns on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables: market capitalization and book to market ratio. In the remaining,
we concentrate on a post-event window of 21 trading days for top executives, and 31
trading days for other insiders because of the longer reporting delay allowed for the
latter (see Section 3). The reason for this relatively long event window is that we
allow enough time for all information contained in insiders’ trades to be incorporated
in the stock price.
Theory predicts that large ﬁrms are typically more followed by analysts, so that
20there should be less information asymmetry between management and investors. In
addition, the market for these companies is more liquid, so that large trades have less
price impact. By contrast, insider trades in small ﬁrms that are more opaque would
imply more information revelation. Table 4 shows the abnormal returns following
insider trading broken down into ﬁrm size terciles. We determine ﬁrm size every year,
on the 1st of January, by multiplying the stock price by the total number of shares
outstanding. Then, we separate ﬁrms into three quantiles: small caps, mid caps and
large caps. As expected, purchases by top executives in small companies have very
high and signiﬁcant abnormal returns. By contrast, purchases by top executives in
the large cap group provides almost no abnormal return. We also observe that sales
by both types of insiders in mid-size ﬁrms provide large negative abnormal returns,
but not in large ﬁrms.
[Table 4 about here.]
The book to market ratio of a ﬁrm is known in the asset pricing literature to
proxy for the value anomaly. There is evidence from previous studies with U.S. data
that insiders act as contrarians (see e.g. Jenter, 2005): at an aggregate level, there
are more insider purchases in value ﬁrms and more insider sales in growth ﬁrms, thus
explaining in part the proﬁt made by insiders. It is thought that insiders have a
better idea of the growth opportunities of their companies and their trades can help
to correct the expectations of the market, thus providing abnormal returns to their
trades. Table 5 shows the CARs after trades by insiders, broken down into book
to market terciles. Value ﬁrms are those that have a market price relatively small
with respect to the book value. If the company is indeed under-valued by the market,
insiders’ purchases should be followed by large abnormal returns. By contrast, growth
ﬁrms are those for which the stock price is high relative to the accounting value. If
insiders sell shares, the signal should be clear that the ﬁrm is over-valued by the
21market. In Table 5 we see that top executives that buy shares in value ﬁrms make
indeed a large and signiﬁcant abnormal return. In the same column, we also note
that the average CAR and the test statistic diminishes with the book to market ratio
(i.e. going to Mid BM ﬁrms and Growth ﬁrms). The pattern is less clear for sales by
top executives. Their sales do not predict future down turns for growth ﬁrms. Other
insiders, on the other hand, do not proﬁt from buying shares in value ﬁrms, but they
do take advantage of selling shares of growth ﬁrms before a down turn.
[Table 5 about here.]
Tables 4 and 5 showed an overview of some patterns of stock price movements after
insider trading, at the company level. Since there might be many other confounding
factors that explain these patterns, in the next sub-section we will study the impact
of insider trading in a regression framework.
5.3 Cross-sectional regression
As explained above, the cross-sectional regression framework allows us to use trade
information at the insider level, and to use individual and company characteristics.
In order to do so, we now use insider-day events, instead of company-day events. This
allows us to study the eﬀect of trade-speciﬁc information, as well as company-speciﬁc
characteristics while controlling for other relevant factors.
Many of the control variables that we use are dummy variables that represent
membership in a group. These groups are size terciles, book to market terciles,
industry membership, regulatory regime and notiﬁcation delay groups. The industry
groups are classiﬁed according the the ICB industry classiﬁcation.8
8ICB stands for Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark. It is created by Dow Jones and FTSE. There
are ten industries in this classiﬁcation framework. Information about the ICB industry of Dutch
ﬁrms is taken from Datastream.
22To solve the dummy variable trap (i.e. exact multicolinearity), we use constrained
OLS estimation. This makes the results easier to interpret because we do not have
to take one group as a reference group. The constraints are such that the coeﬃcients
of every set of dummy variables must have a weighted average equal to zero. The
weights applied are the proportion of the observations in each group. With this a
speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of the dummy variables gives the deviation from the
overall mean eﬀect. Details about the constrained OLS used for the cross-sectional
regression are found in Appendix B.
For top executives, we have access to the information concerning the holdings of
the insider before the trade. We use this information to control for the importance
of the stake the insider has in the ﬁrm. This might inﬂuence the signal given to the
market. Speciﬁcally, we use the proportion of all shares outstanding owned by the
insider. In addition, we control for the size of the trade. We use two alternative
variables to proxy for this: the relative volume and the relative turnover. The former
variable is deﬁned as the number of shares traded divided by the total number of
shares outstanding. The latter variable is the euro value of the trade divided by
the average daily euro turnover for the stock. (The average daily euro turnover is
computed every year for each stock.)
We use a dummy variable “Cluster” to control for the trades that are closely
followed by other trades by the same company. The variable Cluster is equal to
one when any insider of a given company trades on the same side within one week
of interval before or after the current trade, and zero otherwise. For example, if
two insiders of the same company buy shares in a given week, the Cluster dummy
is equal to one for both observations that come into the cross-sectional regression.
This dummy variable is used to test the stealth trading hypothesis (see Barclay and
Warner, 1993), which states that insiders that trade on private information have
the incentive to split their trade into several small trades so that their information
23would be less likely to be detected by the market (and also to catch less the scrutiny
of the legislator).9 The coeﬃcient of this variable will therefore capture whether
insiders cluster their trades when they trade upon information, or when they trade
for liquidity reasons. For exercise of options, this variable is deﬁned as trades in
shares that are done within one week before or after the exercise of the option, on the
same side. More precisely, if an insider exercises his stock option and sells the shares
obtained, the Cluster dummy would be equal to one if within a week, an insider of
the same ﬁrm sold shares. Similarly, when an insider buys shares within a week of a
conversion of option into shares, the Cluster dummy is equal to one.
In addition to ﬁrm-level and individual characteristics, we use a market-wide
characteristic that is not captured by the market model in the event study method-
ology. It is known in the market liquidity literature that the level of liquidity aﬀect
ﬁrms’ returns (see e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Amihud, 2002). In
the time period in which our sample takes place, there are periods of high liquidity
and of low liquidity, and this factor aﬀects ﬁrms’ returns as well as abnormal returns
to insider trading. The proxy for market liquidity is a variable called ILLIQ (see
Amihud, 2002). Our measure of illiquidity is based on the median monthly illiquidity
in the market. It is computed as follows:









for each ﬁrm i, where d is the day of the month m (from 1 to D). rid is the log
return of day d. Vid is the number of shares traded during day d for ﬁrm i. From
9Note that our event window is one month for top executives and a month and a half for other
insiders, so the CARs obtained are not likely to include price movements due solely to price impacts
of trades. Alternative deﬁnitions of clusters (e.g. trade by other insiders of the same company, trades
that are done within two weeks instead of one week) were used (not shown here) and results where
the same.
24these ﬁrm-speciﬁc monthly measures, we obtain a market-wide illiquidity measure by
taking the median ﬁrm in the month.
Regression results are presented in Table 8. Coeﬃcients for control dummy vari-
ables are shown in Table 9. In addition, we show some descriptive statistics of the
group dummies and regression variables in Tables 6 and 7.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
The results are separated into insider type (top executives, other insiders) and
trade type (purchases, sales, exercise of options). For each, two speciﬁcations are
shown. The ﬁrst, called Model (1) uses as a measure of trade size the share volume
relative to the total number of shares outstanding. Model (2) uses euro volume
relative to the average daily euro turnover.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Table 8 is that the intercept of all regressions is
insigniﬁcant.10 This is in contrast with the graphs showing unconditional averages
of CARs, above (Figure 2 and 4), where the average abnormal returns were large
and signiﬁcant. This means that some factors or characteristics are responsible for
bringing the CAR far from zero in Figures 2 and 4.
[Table 8 about here.]
For top executives, their holdings of their company stock is an important fac-
tor indicating information. The larger their holding in the company, the more their
purchases are related to future positive abnormal returns. This means either that
executives with large holdings are more informed, or they refrain to buy new shares
10Note that the explanatory variables are all deviations from their mean. Thus, the intercept
represents the average CAR for non clustered trades.
25unless their company has very good future prospects. For sales, the eﬀect of holdings
is not signiﬁcant. This contrasts with the results obtained in Fidrmuc, Goergen, and
Renneboog (2006) who document that CEOs with large holdings send an entrench-
ment signal when they purchase more shares.11
The ILLIQ variable helps to explain the magnitude of abnormal returns. For
ease of interpretation, the variable has been divided by its standard deviation. The
coeﬃcient is the increase in abnormal returns when illiquidity of the market increases
by one standard deviation. For top executives, this variable is signiﬁcant for all
types of trades. For purchases, the sign of the coeﬃcient is positive, meaning that
purchases in times of low market liquidity are followed by higher abnormal returns.
This is consistent with the hypothesis of information content of insider purchases.
Indeed, if liquidity is low, and thus implicit trading costs are high, an investor would
require a higher rate of return to compensate. Or in other words, an insider would
refrain to trade unless the information content is high.
Interestingly, the sign of the illiquidity coeﬃcient is also positive and signiﬁcant
for sales (only top executives). This means this variable has the opposite eﬀect
for sales compared to purchases: sales in period of illiquid markets trigger higher
(i.e. less negative, or even positive) abnormal returns. The eﬀect is economically
important: when the market’s illiquidity increases by one standard deviation, the
abnormal returns are 1.82% higher in average. This result can be explained by the
timing ability in conjunction with the liquidity motivation for sales. In times of low
liquidity, if insiders have to sell, they will choose the right moment, e.g. after good
news on the ﬁrm or whenever other market players need to buy. This is in line with
the conjecture of Aktas, De Bodt, and Van Oppens (2007).
11The authors use information about the shareholder structure of the ﬁrms. In their regression,
they ﬁnd that purchases by CEOs that own a large stake in their ﬁrm produce a large abnormal return
only when there is another blockholder that acts as a monitor. If there is no active blockholder, the
entrenchment is seen as a negative signal by the market and produces negative abnormal returns.
26The variables that proxy for trade size give interesting results. For both top
executives and other insiders share purchases, the coeﬃcients are negative. This
means that very large purchases are not associated higher abnormal returns. This is
consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis of Barclay and Warner (1993), which
stipulates that traders tend to use small or medium trades to trade upon information.
But it is in strong contrast with the literature, in particular Betzer and Theissen
(2008) and Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006), where they report (although
not in regression framework) that the CARs are higher for higher trade sizes. This
shows that it is important to control for other characteristics.
The Cluster dummy variable for purchases has a coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcant
either for purchases or for sales. This means that insiders do not systematically use
clustered trades when they trade upon information, as the stealth trading hypothesis
suggests.
Results concerning group dummies are shown in Table 9. The coeﬃcients of these
dummies is taken from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in each category of insider and trade.
Note that the coeﬃcients designate the diﬀerence of a group with respect of the overall
mean. Similar to what is obtained in Table 4, we see that purchases by top executives
in small ﬁrms are followed by strong positive abnormal returns. In contrast, sales by
top executives in small ﬁrms do not impact subsequent share price. This is in line
with the hypothesis that purchases are more informed than sales.
[Table 9 about here.]
In contrast to top executives, other insiders have no impact on abnormal returns
when they buy shares, but they do have an impact when they sell in small and medium
ﬁrms. It may be conjectured that other insiders allow themselves to sell shares in
front of bad news because they fear less the regulator’s scrutiny than top executives.
27The eﬀect of book-to-market ratio is also similar in the regression framework com-
pared to the results in Table 5. Top executives that buy stocks in value ﬁrms obtain
positive and signiﬁcant abnormal returns. This is consistent with insiders indicating
that the market is undervaluing the company. Similar results are obtained for other
insiders. Buying value stocks is followed by large positive abnormal returns. In addi-
tion, when other insiders sell growth stocks, there is a sharp decrease in subsequent
returns. This is consistent with information that the market is overvaluing the stock.
For top executives, we have a more precise information about the position of the
insider in the ﬁrm. The last group dummies distinguish between “Board of directors”
and “Supervisory board”. We see that the abnormal returns following trades do not
diﬀer between these two categories of top executives.
The right hand side Table 8 shows regression results for exercise of options. Since
the majority of these trades are actually liquidation (exercise and sale of the shares),
we do not show diﬀerent regression results for option conversion. Rather, we control
for those insiders who convert instead of liquidating by a dummy variable. Coeﬃcients
of these dummies (not shown in tables) are that insiders who sell shares at the same
time as liquidating their options account for 7% of the sample, and the abnormal
return for this group is on average 3.9% lower (signiﬁcant at the 5% level) than those
who just liquidate their options. In contrast, those who keep part or the total number
of shares obtained by the option account for 13.5% of the sample, and they do not
obtain statistically diﬀerent abnormal returns than the average option exercise.
For other insiders, the proportion of option exercises that are full liquidation of
the shares obtained is even higher: 91%. And no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is measured between those who sell more than the option, those who liquidate the
shares, and those who keep some shares.
Table 8 shows as well that for top executives option exercises, the variable ILLIQ is
28negative and signiﬁcant. This means that when the market liquidity is low, liquidating
options is associated with larger negative abnormal returns. This is consistent with
information.
5.4 Regulatory implications
The regression framework allows us to study the eﬀect of two regulatory aspects.
First, the eﬀect of late reporting can be observed by the coeﬃcients of the fourth
dummy group. As Table 9 shows, a relatively large proportion of top executives
report their trades later than the allowed period stipulated by the regulation (see
column 3 and column 6). The eﬀect of late notiﬁcation for purchases is small and
insigniﬁcant. But the eﬀect is quite important for sales: 39% of stock sales by top
executives are reported late (after winsorizing out the trades that were reported more
than 3 months late, which we assume is a mistake in the data), and these stocks have
in average 1.78% negative abnormal returns (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). That is,
even after controlling for other factors, sales that are reported late to the regulator
carry more information than sales that are reported on time.
The analysis also allows us to study the regulation changes concerning insider
trading, through the years. The ﬁfth dummy group are time dummies that correspond
to diﬀerent regulatory regimes. The diﬀerent regimes are described in Section 3,
above. Still from Table 9, we see that for top executives purchases, no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence can be observed concerning the information content the the trades. For
top executive sales, the abnormal returns were in average 1.11% lower in the period
prior to the Market Abuse Decree. This means that there is nowadays less information
content in the sales of Top executives. The dummy variable for the period immediately
after the implementation of the Market Abuse Decree shows no statistical signiﬁcance.
But the period after November 2006 until the end of the sample shows a positive
29coeﬃcient and is signiﬁcant. This result shows that it took one year (from October
2005 to November 2006) before the eﬀect of the new regulation could be seen on the
average CAR following sales of top executives.
Very similar results are obtained for other insiders. There is no diﬀerence in
abnormal returns following purchases between the periods. For sales, the ﬁrst period
dummy, i.e. prior to September 2002, has a negative coeﬃcient of -0.94%. Note that
this period is where Top executives and Other insiders where not diﬀerentiated in the
dataset. The results show again that in the recent period, sales have less information
content than in earlier periods.
6 Conclusion
Corporate insiders are often allowed to trade in their own company’s stock. Legal
insider trading however is in many countries subject to regulation. This paper ex-
amines the information content of legal insider trading in the Netherlands. We also
investigate how regulatory changes impact this information content. We proxy the in-
formation content by the cumulative abnormal returns around dates at which insiders
trade. We obtain a set of interesting results.
First, we ﬁnd important diﬀerences in information content both between pur-
chases and sales as well as between category of insiders (top executives and other
insiders). For example, the unconditional average abnormal return after purchases
by insiders is large and signiﬁcant: up to 2% in a window of one month and a half.
The information content is lower in magnitude and less signiﬁcant for sales. When
separating between category of insiders, the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal
return is larger for top executives whereas it is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero for other insiders. This is consistent with top executives being much better
30informed than other insiders. However, other insiders seem to have a good timing
ability: they buy when the stock is at a relative low and sell when it is at a relative
high.
Second, important diﬀerences in information content of insiders’ trades exist be-
tween small and large ﬁrms and between ﬁrms within diﬀerent book-to-market ter-
ciles. Separating the sample in size terciles, the abnormal returns after purchases
by top executives are much larger for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. This is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that small ﬁrms are more opaque and less followed by
the press and by analysts, so that legal insider trading confers more information to
the market (or in other words, there is more information asymmetry in these stocks.)
Breaking down the sample into book-to-market terciles, we ﬁnd that purchases by top
executives are more informative for value ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that have low stock price
compared to their accounting value. This suggests that when top executives buy
shares in these value stocks, it is perceived as a sign that the company’s prospects
are good.
Third, we employ a regression framework in order to sort out the possible con-
founding factors, and to control for more variables that explain the variation in ab-
normal returns. We show that large holdings prior to purchases by top executives are
associated with greater abnormal returns: insiders that have large holdings are more
informed. A larger relative trading volume however is not associated with information
asymmetry: the larger the purchase, the lower the abnormal returns. We also ﬁnd
that market conditions are important determinants of the magnitude of the abnormal
returns. For purchases by top executives, a market with low liquidity is associated
with higher abnormal returns. This is consistent with information asymmetry. For
insider sales, market liquidity has the opposite eﬀect: a lower market liquidity is as-
sociated with less information asymmetry. It is as if insiders make less informed sales
when the market is less liquid. This is consistent with diversiﬁcation motives.
31Fourth, new to this literature is the comparison of the exercise of employee stock
options to purchases and sales of shares. We observe that a very small proportion of
insiders convert their options to stocks. Most of the time, they liquidate the shares
obtained, and the abnormal returns are on average negative after the execution of the
options.
Finally, we study the impact of regulatory changes on legal insider trading in
the Netherlands, especially the impact of the implementation of the Market Abuse
Directive of the European Union. We show that this new legislation had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on sales by top executives. The sales following the implementation of the Market
Abuse Directive were less information driven. Another policy implication of this study
is the fact that many insiders report their trades after the legal notiﬁcation period
allowed by law. We show that sales that are notiﬁed late are followed with negative
abnormal returns. These sales have thus more information content and should be
monitored more closely.
Overall, the results show that some trades by insiders are information driven,
and the public registry of insider trading can be used by outsiders to evaluate the
fundamental value of the stocks. This is consistent with legal insider trading being a
channel through which information circulates from the ﬁrm to the investors.
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34Appendix
A Event study methodology
The event study methodology used in this paper is exposed here. For each company-
day observation, we run the following regression:
rit = αi + βirmt + εit ,
where rit is the return of ﬁrm i at time t, rmt is the return of the AEX index at time
t, αi and βi are the parameters for ﬁrm i, and εit is an error term. The normal rate
of return is the expectation of the company’s return conditional of the contemporary
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= ˆ αi + ˆ βirmt .
The abnormal return, or AR, for a given ﬁrm at a given date is the diﬀerence between
the realized return and the normal return:
ARit = rit −
￿
ˆ αi + ˆ βirmt
￿
.
The cumulative abnormal return, or CAR, for a given ﬁrm is the sum of the daily





We then aggregate the abnormal returns of all company-days in the sample by aver-







The main hypothesis to test is whether the average cumulative abnormal return,
or CAR, is diﬀerent to zero. The test statistic is the following (the J2 statistic in the
















35Under the assumptions of independence of the abnormal returns between events, this
test statistic is approximately distributed as standard normal.
B Cross-sectional regression methodology
Here is the regression equation (in matrix notation):
CAR = γ0ι +
D X
d=1
Xdδd + Y γ + ￿ .
There are a total of N observations, with k + 1 regressors (including the constant).
The notation is the following:
γ0 is the intercept (a scalar),
ι is a N-vector of ones,
D (a scalar) is the number of category sets (size categories, book-to-market cate-
gories, notiﬁcation delay categories, industry categories, etc.),
Xd is a N × length(δd) matrix of dummies that associate each observation to the
right category,
δd is the vector of the coeﬃcients of each category,
Y is a N × length(γ) matrix of other regressors,
γ is a vector of coeﬃcients, and
￿ is the vector of OLS residuals.
In order to identify the coeﬃcients, we use the following restrictions:
ω
0
dδd = 0 , d = 1,...,D ,
where ωd is a set of weights. In words, the weighted sum of the coeﬃcients of the
dummies, for each set, must be equal to 0. By imposing this restriction, we can
identify the intercept, and the eﬀect of each dummy in a category set. For example,
in the size category set, if the coeﬃcient for small capitalization ﬁrms is positive, it
means that this category has relatively more impact than the average ﬁrm, in addition
to the value of the intercept.
The weights are set in order to balance the fact that some categories have more
observations than others. For example, in the industry dummy set, the industry
“Health care” have less observations than other industries. Using this weighting
scheme gives more intuitive results, as the sum of the coeﬃcients in a given category
set is always zero, even if the number of observations is not equal in each category.
This is obtained simply by setting the weight to be the number of observations in a
given category divided by the total number of observations.
36C Computation of the standard-deviations in the
cross-sectional regression
We need a robust method for the standard-deviation for the cross-sectional regression
because we use observations that are de-aggregated, i.e. insider-day events. The
variance-covariance matrix used to robust to heteroskedasticity between observations,
as well as robust to clustering. By clustering, we mean two or more insiders from the
same company that trade during the same day. In this case, the CAR of the stock is
not independent between these observations; on the contrary the CAR will be identical
for these observations. Ignoring this fact would bias upward the test statistic, thus
over-rejecting a null hypothesis.











where ˆ Σ is the robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms.






ˆ Σ1 0 ··· 0
0 ˆ Σ2 ··· 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .






where the index represents the company-day events. If many insiders from the same
company trade during the same day, the element ˆ Σi is not a scalar, but a square
matrix of size equal to the number of observations for this company-day. In this case,
this square matrix is equal to:
ˆ Σi =
 




where J is the number of insiders of the ith company trading during this day, and
where 1J is a square matrix of ones of size J, and ˆ ￿i· is the OLS residual.
An example will illustrate best how the matrix ˆ Σ is constructed. Assume there
are four observations for the cross-sectional regression, i.e. four CARs. Assume two of
them are trades by insiders from the same company that traded during the same day.
We have CARij for company i = 1 to 3. Company i = 2 has two insiders and so we
have j = 1 to 2 for that company. We estimate the coeﬃcients by OLS, and we obtain







ˆ Σ1 0 0
0 ˆ Σ2 0
































38Figure 1: Timing of an event study
This ﬁgure shows the time line of an event study. The event date is Te. The estimation of the
benchmark model uses n observations from date T0 until (but excluding) date T1. Abnormal returns
are computed for the m periods of the event window, which starts at date T1 and ends at date T2.
t1 t2 t3 tn tn+1 tn+2 tn+m






Figure 2: Trades of shares
The graph shows the average cumulative abnormal returns around purchases and sales of shares by
insiders. The two curves are normalized to be zero at day −1.






































































39Figure 3: Exercise of employee stock options
The graph shows the average cumulative abnormal returns around exercises of employee stock options
by insiders, where insiders can sell all the shares, or they can keep at least part of the shares. The
two curves are normalized to be zero at day −1.







































































40Figure 4: Category of insiders, shares and options
This ﬁgure shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and
for other insiders, and for trades in shares and exercise of employee stock options. In the case of
options, insiders can either keep the shares (convert the option), or sell the shares (liquidate the
obtained shares). The x axis shows the day relative to the trade day, which is day zero. The y axis
shows the average CAR in percentage points. All graphs are normalized such that the average CAR
is zero at day -1. The markers show the signiﬁcance level: circles, squares and triangles indicate 1%,
5% and 10% signiﬁcance level, respectively.









Top executives −− Shares




































































Other insiders −− Shares






































































Top executives −− Options






































































Other insiders −− Options



























































41Table 1: Summary of the insider trading regulations




Sept. 2002 Wmz 1996 – Art. 2a Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: immediately after the
trade
Nov. 2006 Wmz 2006 – Art. 16 New legislation, but the rules are the same.
Other insiders
Date Act-article Content
Apr. 1999 *Wte 1995 – Art. 46b Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: 10 days after the end of
the month
Oct. 2005 Wte 1995 – Art. 47a Notiﬁcation of trades. Delay: 5 working days or until
the total value of trades reaches A C5,000. In any case,
notiﬁcation has to be done before the end of the calendar
year.
Oct. 2005 Market Abuse Decree
2005 – Art. 2
Exceptions to the notiﬁcation:
a) if shares are given to the insider as part of employee
scheme in doing a constant course of action;
b) exercising options granted by employee scheme on
the expiration date or within 5 working days prior to
the expiration date;
c) if the shares obtained are sold, there is an exception
on the prohibition if there was a written note made on
the subject at least 4 months before the expiry date.
*Note that between April 1999 and September 2002, all insiders had to notify their trades according
to this provision, including directors and members of supervisory boards.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table shows some descriptive statistics of the combined dataset of insider trading. The trades











Shares 117 416 1152 1869
Options 65 192 330 464
Other insiders
Shares 127 899 1493 2174
Options 70 617 830 1254
All 149 1654 3612 5761
42Table 3: Variable deﬁnition
We deﬁne here the variables used in the cross-sectional regression. Variables followed by an asterisk
(∗) are available only for top executives.
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent variables
CAR(0,20) Average cumulative abnormal return starting at day zero (the trading day)
and ending day 20 (approx. 1 month).
CAR(0,30) Average cumulative abnormal return starting at day zero (the trading day)
and ending day 30 (approx. 1 and a half month).
Explanatory variables – Dummy variables
Small cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the smallest tercile group, based on market
capitalization computed at the beginning of each calendar year.
Mid cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the middle tercile group, based on market
capitalization computed at the beginning of each calendar year.
Large cap Equals 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the largest tercile group, based on market
capitalization computed at the beginning of each calendar year.
Growth ﬁrm Equals 1 if the company is in the tercile with the lowest book to market ratio.
The companies in the sample are ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Mid BM Equals 1 if the company is in the second book to market tercile. The companies
in the sample are ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Value ﬁrm Equals 1 if the company is in the tercile with the highest book to market ratio.
The companies in the sample are ranked every beginning of calendar year.
Notiﬁcation in time Equals 1 if the notiﬁcation of the trade is done within the limits established
by the regulations.
Late notiﬁcation Equals 1 if the notiﬁcation of the trade is made after the time limit established
by regulation.
Board of directors∗ Equals 1 if the insider is member of the board of directors.
Supervisory board∗ Equals 1 if the insider is member of the supervirosy board.
Cluster Equals 1 if any insider from the same company traded stocks within a window
of 1 week before or after the trade.
Explanatory variables – Continuous variables
Holdings ∗ The holdings in shares of the insider prior to the trade. Holdings are deﬁned
as the stake of the insider as the proportion of the total number of shares
outstanding. This variable is provided only for trades in shares.
Volume The trade size in shares relative to the total number of shares outstanding.
Turnover The trade’s turnover in A C divided by the average daily turnover of the stock
(computed at the beginning of each calendar year).
ILLIQ Moving average of the median of Amihud’s illiquidity measure for the ﬁrms
in the sample during the calendar month preceding the trade. The illiquidity
measure is the absolute return divided by the euro value of the shares traded.
See Equation 1. In the regression, this measure is standardized for ease of
interpretation of the coeﬃcient.
43Table 4: Breakdown by size
This table shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and
for other insiders. Only trades of shares are used here, not trades related to exercises of employee
stock options. The event period is a 21 trading day period (beginning with the transaction day) for
top executives, and a 31 trading day period for other insiders. The average CAR is broken down into
market capitalization terciles. In each row, the ﬁrst number shows the average CAR, the second in
brackets shows the test statistic, and the third is the number of observations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Firm size Top executives Other insiders
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Small caps 8.02% 0.75% 0.99% -5.12%
(4.22) ∗∗∗ (0.15) (0.50) (-0.37)
178 161 175 176
Mid caps 0.37% -3.03% 1.63% -3.72%
(-0.23) (-2.43) ∗∗ (-0.09) (-3.29) ∗∗∗
231 139 235 405
Large caps 0.30% -1.43% 0.29% 1.53%
(1.24) (0.09) (1.58) (1.83) ∗
399 136 366 326
All 1.97% -1.16% 0.83% -2.04%
(2.73) ∗∗∗ (-1.23) (1.28) (-1.27)
808 436 776 907
Table 5: Breakdown by book to market ratio
This table shows the average cumulative abnormal returns to insider trading for top executives and
for other insiders. Only trades of shares are used here, not trades related to exercises of employee
stock options. The event period for top executives is a 21 trading day period beginning with the
transaction day. For other insiders, the event period spans 31 days including and after the trade.
The CAR is broken down into book to market terciles. At the beginning of January of each year,
the book to market ratio of ﬁrms in the sample is computed and ﬁrms are then separated into three
groups. High book to market is a proxy for value ﬁrms, low book to market is for growth ﬁrms. In
each row, the ﬁrst number shows the average CAR, the second number in brackets shows the test
statistic, and the third is the number of observations. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Book-to-market ratio Top executives Other insiders
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Value ﬁrms 5.33% 4.33% 2.39% 1.61%
(5.12) ∗∗∗ (1.35) (1.20) (0.49)
149 60 182 107
Medium 1.69% -3.44% 1.79% -0.13%
(0.64) (-2.68) ∗∗∗ (0.62) (0.55)
319 159 287 310
Growth ﬁrms 0.77% -0.85% -1.36% -4.27%
(0.20) (-0.16) (0.51) (-2.38) ∗∗
340 217 307 490
All 1.97% -1.16% 0.83% -2.04%
(2.73) ∗∗∗ (-1.23) (1.28) (-1.27)
808 436 776 907
44Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions
– Shares
Variables used are deﬁned in Table 3.
Descriptive statistics
Top executives
Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
Holdings 0.8307 6.3408 -0.0091 0.0000 0.0004 0.0068 53.69
ILLIQ 1.1518 1.2543 0.1754 0.3109 0.5638 1.6286 4.8516
Volume 0.0092 0.0662 7.500E-9 2.205E-6 4.461E-5 4.667E-4 1.0000




Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 1.2264 1.0176 0.1754 0.4631 0.8684 1.6647 4.8516
Volume 0.0041 0.0387 4.352E-9 5.907E-6 6.419E-5 4.058E-4 1.0000







Volume 0.053 -0.001 1




Turnover 0.030 0.190 1
45Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions
– Options
Variables used are deﬁned in Table 3.
Descriptive statistics
Top executives
Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 0.7207 0.8359 0.1754 0.2514 0.4665 0.7311 4.6227
Volume 1.034E-3 3.244E-3 8.255E-8 8.850E-5 3.326E-4 7.549E-4 0.0421




Variable Mean St.dev Min Q2 Median Q3 Max
ILLIQ 0.8625 0.7087 0.1754 0.2852 0.5790 1.2886 4.4516
Volume 2.281E-4 6.418E-4 2.200E-8 1.543E-5 5.736E-5 2.076E-4 0.0104











Turnover 0.023 0.603 1
46Table 8: Cross-sectional regression results
This table shows cross-sectional regression results. In Panel A, results for top executives are shown, where the 21-day cumulative abnormal return
is used as dependent variable. In Panel B, results for other insiders are shown with CAR(0,30) as dependent variable. In each panel and for each
category of trade (purchases, sales, exercise of options), we control for groups using dummy variables (coeﬃcients of groups shown in subsequent tables.)
Right-hand-side variables used are deﬁned in Table 3. For each category of trade, two speciﬁcations are used, denoted as Model (1) and Model (2). The
observations are Winsorized at the 98 percentile to avoid biases due to outliers. Trades for which the notiﬁcation delay was greater than 90 calendars
days were omitted. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A – Top executives – Dependent variable: CAR(0,20)
Purchases Sales Options
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat)
Intercept -0.0018 (-0.17) -0.0024 (-0.22) -0.0166 (-1.03) -0.0166 (-1.05) 0.0129 (1.00) 0.0125 (0.98)
Cluster 0.0111 (0.94) 0.0118 (0.99) 0.0044 (0.25) 0.0046 (0.27) -0.0156 (-1.16) -0.0153 (-1.13)
Holdings 0.0672 (3.04) ∗∗∗ 0.0677 (2.79) ∗∗∗ 0.0448 (0.98) 0.0477 (1.09) – – – –
ILLIQ 0.0076 (1.90) ∗ 0.0082 (2.02) ∗∗ 0.0182 (2.18) ∗∗ 0.0186 (2.21) ∗∗ -0.0183 (-3.86) ∗∗∗ -0.0181 (-3.79) ∗∗∗
Volume -0.1757 (-3.33) ∗∗∗ – – 0.0165 (0.14) – – -0.2100 (-0.26) – –
Turnover – – -0.0000 (-1.48) – – -0.0000 (-0.08) – – 0.0000 (0.68)
N 1355 1336 492 436 464 461
Adj. R2 0.0956 0.0895 0.0445 0.0955 0.1210 0.1217
Panel B – Other insiders – Dependent variable: CAR(0,30)
Purchases Sales Options
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat) Coef (t-stat)
Intercept -0.0025 (-0.19) -0.0011 (-0.08) -0.0146 (-1.61) -0.0158 (-1.72) ∗ -0.0124 (-1.52) -0.0125 (-1.53)
Cluster 0.0191 (1.12) 0.0199 (1.15) 0.0056 (0.54) 0.0072 (0.68) -0.0095 (-1.07) -0.0102 (-1.15)
ILLIQ -0.0108 (-0.96) -0.0082 (-0.71) 0.0052 (1.19) 0.0051 (1.17) -0.0047 (-0.73) -0.0045 (-0.71)
Volume -0.4550 (-3.70) ∗∗∗ – – -0.2036 (-1.78) ∗ – – 3.0078 (0.40) – –
Turnover – – -0.0000 (-2.15) ∗∗ – – 0.0000 (0.48) – – 0.0000 (0.55)
N 1170 1155 1001 1001 1251 1240
Adj. R2 0.0865 0.0643 0.0795 0.0762 0.1572 0.1545
4
7Table 9: Cross-sectional regression results: Group eﬀects for trades of shares
This table shows the group eﬀects of trades of shares. For each type of insider and each category of trade, only one speciﬁcation of the regressions is
shown here, namely Model (1) of Table 8. The results for the groups are qualitatively similar for the second speciﬁcation. Variables used are deﬁned
in Table 3. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Groups Top executives Other insiders
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Coef (t-stat) Prop. Coef (t-stat) Prop. Coef (t-stat) Prop. Coef (t-stat) Prop.
1. Market cap
Small cap 0.0319 (2.86) ∗∗∗ .14 0.0113 (1.14) .35 -0.0141 (-0.87) .16 -0.0244 (-2.13) ∗∗ .18
Mid cap -0.0076 (-1.10) .28 -0.0084 (-1.14) .31 -0.0108 (-0.70) .29 -0.0150 (-3.08) ∗∗∗ .42
Large cap -0.0041 (-1.14) .57 -0.0041 (-0.45) .34 0.0098 (1.28) .55 0.0267 (4.84) ∗∗∗ .40
2. Book to market
Value stock 0.0291 (3.09) ∗∗∗ .17 0.0274 (1.59) .13 0.0477 (2.76) ∗∗∗ .25 0.0376 (2.95) ∗∗∗ .14
Medium -0.0002 (-0.04) .40 -0.0181 (-2.38) ∗∗ .38 -0.0194 (-1.88) ∗ .38 0.0098 (1.63) .39
Growth stock -0.0112 (-2.31) ∗∗ .43 0.0070 (1.11) .49 -0.0130 (-1.17) .37 -0.0201 (-3.95) ∗∗∗ .46
3. Industry
Oil & Gas 0.0550 (4.58) ∗∗∗ .01 0.0442 (2.50) ∗∗ .03 0.0293 (1.20) .02 -0.0221 (-0.99) .01
Basic Materials -0.0404 (-3.27) ∗∗∗ .01 0.0029 (0.15) .02 -0.0499 (-1.97) ∗∗ .02 -0.0190 (-0.68) .02
Industrials 0.0075 (1.22) .34 0.0086 (0.84) .16 0.0095 (0.80) .39 -0.0247 (-2.85) ∗∗∗ .26
Consumer Goods -0.0155 (-1.98) ∗∗ .16 0.0257 (2.18) ∗∗ .17 -0.0267 (-1.90) ∗ .14 0.0087 (0.90) .10
Health Care -0.0119 (-0.41) .02 -0.0322 (-1.58) .06 0.2536 (2.89) ∗∗∗ .02 -0.0209 (-0.60) .00
Consumer Services 0.0109 (1.07) .12 0.0232 (2.07) ∗∗ .11 -0.0028 (-0.17) .13 0.0411 (4.57) ∗∗∗ .14
Telecommunications 0.0194 (1.05) .00 0.0985 (1.97) ∗∗ .01 0.0380 (0.69) .04 0.1193 (10.54) ∗∗∗ .00
Financials -0.0069 (-1.05) .28 -0.0199 (-1.41) .20 -0.0359 (-1.54) .15 -0.0081 (-1.09) .24
Technology 0.0137 (0.60) .04 -0.0193 (-1.53) .24 -0.0033 (-0.11) .09 0.0114 (1.11) .22
4. Delay groups
Notiﬁcation in time -0.0004 (-0.11) .57 0.0114 (2.34) ∗∗ .61 0.0011 (1.01) .96 0.0013 (2.08) ∗∗ .96
Late notiﬁcation 0.0005 (0.11) .43 -0.0178 (-2.34) ∗∗ .39 -0.0286 (-1.01) .04 -0.0327 (-2.08) ∗∗ .04
5. Regulatory regimes
Before Sept. 1, 2002 – – – – – – 0.0090 (1.01) .48 -0.0094 (-2.11) ∗∗ .50
Sept. 2, 2002 – Oct. 1, 2005 0.0026 (0.71) .61 -0.0111 (-2.26) ∗∗ .61 0.0064 (0.35) .22 0.0017 (0.25) .33
Oct. 1, 2005 – Nov. 1, 2006 -0.0050 (-0.70) .19 0.0069 (0.68) .19 -0.0046 (-0.23) .06 0.0235 (1.38) .05
After Nov. 1, 2006 -0.0031 (-0.36) .19 0.0276 (2.37) ∗∗ .20 -0.0229 (-1.64) .24 0.0237 (2.30) ∗∗ .13
6. Position
Board of directors -0.0002 (-0.18) .85 0.0015 (0.38) .69 – – – – – –
Supervisory board 0.0013 (0.18) .15 -0.0034 (-0.38) .31 – – – – – –
4
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